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Unlike mathematicians, statisticians fight tooth and nail about the nature of their 
subject. What are probabilities, really? Actual or long-run relative frequencies? 
Measures satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms? Physical propensities? Degrees of belief? 
All those views and more have their defenders, and the differences have an impact on 
what to believe and do on the basis of data. The frequentist Jerzy Neyman wrote an 
aggressive 1961 paper called ‘Silver jubilee of my dispute with Fisher’ [23] and debate 
by practitioners on issues of principle remains vigorous (e.g. [15]). 
One view of probability is of special interest to mathematicians because it offers to 
make sense of the notion of non-conclusive evidence for conjectures in (pure) 
mathematics. Mathematicians certainly say things like “We have strong numerical 
evidence for our conjecture”; “the consensus by then was that the proof of the 
classification of finite simple groups was close to completion”, and so on. Those forms 
of words do not mean anything in the deductive logic that is the official language of 
mathematical proof. What sense can be made of the notion of the probability that an 
unproved mathematical conjecture is true? 
 
Evidence for mathematical conjectures 
Since George Pólya’s celebrated books of the 1950s on “mathematics and plausible 
reasoning” [24] there have been occasional discussions of how mathematical 
conjectures can be supported by non-conclusive evidence. (Many recent examples in 
[6]). Pólya gives an example from Euler, published in an age before it was customary 
for mathematicians to cover up their working evidence for conjectures once it had been 
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superseded by a proof. He used some daring and obviously far from rigorous methods to 
conclude that the infinite sum 
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is equal to the prima facie unlikely value π2/6 . Finding that the two expressions agreed 
to seven decimal places, and that a similar method of argument led to the already proved 
result 
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Euler concluded, “For our method, which may appear to some as not reliable enough, a 
great confirmation comes here to light. Therefore, we shall not doubt at all of the other 
things which are derived by the same method.” Surely he was right (except perhaps for 
the “at all”). The evidence was not perfect, but it was very strong. He later succeeded in 
proving the result. ([24] vol. I, 18-21) 
In modern times, there has naturally been interest in evaluating the evidence for and 
against the Riemann Hypothesis, while we await its proof. (Review in [12]) Expert 
opinion is that the Hypothesis is almost certainly true. An early piece of evidence was 
that it implied the Prime Number Theorem, which was proved independently. André 
Weil’s proof of the hypothesis for analogues of the zeta function in a different context 
provides, says Harold Edwards in his book Riemann’s Zeta Function, “some of the best 
reasons for believing that the Riemann hypothesis is true – for believing, in other words, 
that there is a profound and as yet uncomprehended number-theoretic phenomenon, one 
facet of which is that the roots  all lie on Re s = ½.”  ([8], 268-9) Perhaps the most 
substantial reason against comes again from its close connection with the Prime 
Number Theorem, which in one form states that the number of primes less than x is (for 
large x) approximately equal to the integral 
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If tables are drawn up for the number of primes less than x and the values of this 
integral, for x as far as calculations can reach, then it is always found that the number of 
primes less than x is actually less than the integral. On that evidence, it was thought at 
one time that this was true for all x. Nevertheless Littlewood proved that this is false. 
The first number for which it is false, however, appears to be well beyond the range of 
computer calculations, which gives some slight hint that there may be a large 
counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis even though there are no small ones. 
In a recent Mathematical Intelligencer article [22], Barry Mazur adds to Pólya’s 
ideas a form of non-conclusive reasoning often found in modern number theory, which 
he calls “reasoning from randomness”. The idea is that, subject to known constraints, 
one should guess that everything else in the distributions of numbers is random. An 
older example gives the flavor. Goldbach’s conjecture asserts that every even number 
greater than 2 is the sum of two primes. Now there are a lot of sums of two primes 
about, and more so as the size of numbers increases. Starting from the fact that the 
density of primes around the number n is about  1/ln(n), an easy and rather crude 
statistical analysis will conclude that the number of ways of writing a large even 
number m as the sum of two primes should be about  m/2ln2m.  Thus the “chance” of a 
large number failing to be the sum of two primes is very small. Of course there is no 
genuine chance in number theory, and it is possible (for all we know at present) for 
some even number to fall through the cracks and fail to be the sum of two primes. But 
workers in the field, as well as amateurs, rightly regard the argument as heuristically 
strong. Similarly, one argument in favor of the Riemann Hypothesis is that any zeros off 
the critical line would imply that the distribution of primes is not as random as it “ought 
to be”. 
Most of the best-known long-standing conjectures are in number theory, but efforts 
are made to weigh the strength of conjectures elsewhere too. The P = NP conjecture of 
theoretical computer science is a strange one. The majority opinion is that  P  ≠ NP, but 
that rests largely on the rather shallow consideration that after much trying, no-one has 
found a polynomial-time algorithm to solve computationally-hard problems. Other than 
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that, comments by experts are near-random [14], while one mathematical team that 
offers a hint of a path to a proof via algebraic geometry estimates that their program will 
require a hundred years. [9] 
Non-deductive reasoning occurs also in more mundane mathematical situations than 
that of long-standing unproved conjectures, and across all fields. Especially in the early 
stages of work on a problem, mathematicians need not merely hunches and beliefs, but 
ones that are as a matter of fact well-supported by the evidence. Anyone can generate 
conjectures, but which ones are worth investigating? Which ones are relevant to the 
problem at hand? Which can be confirmed or refuted in some easy cases, so that there 
will be some indication of their truth in a reasonable time? Which might be capable of 
proof by a method in the mathematician’s repertoire? Which might follow from 
someone else’s theorem? Which are unlikely to yield an answer until after the next 
review of tenure? Which problems are suitable to set as a PhD topic, as likely to be 
solvable or partly solvable by four years’ work at the PhD level? Mathematicians must 
answer these questions to allocate their time and effort. But not all answers to these 
questions are equally good. To stay employed as mathematicians, they must answer a 
proportion of them well. But to say that some answers are better than others is to admit 
that some are, on the evidence at hand, more reasonable than others, that is, are 
rationally better supported by the evidence. That is to accept the objectivity, as a matter 
of logic, of non-deductive relations between evidence and hypothesis. 
Despite a long tradition of interest in non-deductive reasoning, mathematicians have 
shown remarkably little curiosity about what could be meant by evidence for 
mathematical conjectures. Pólya perhaps created confusion with his word “plausible”, 
which suggests something merely psychological, but he rightly saw that it was not a 
matter of subjective impressions, but with what degree of belief was justified by the 
evidence. ([24] vol. I, 68) 
Who can offer an account of that objectivity? Enter logical probability, also known 
as non-deductive logic. 
 
The logical probability theory of evidence 
The logical theory of probability aims to explain what sort of thing evidence is. It 
holds that the relation of evidence to conclusion is a matter of strict logic, like the 
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relation of axioms to theorems in mathematics but less conclusive. Given a fixed body 
of evidence – say in a trial, or in a dispute about a scientific theory, or speculation about 
a mathematical conjecture – and given a conclusion, there is a fixed degree to which the 
evidence supports the conclusion. It says, for example, that if we could establish just 
what the standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” is, then in a given trial, it is an 
objective matter of logical fact whether the evidence presented does or does not meet 
that standard, and so a jury is either right or wrong in its verdict on the evidence. The 
view was first clearly expressed in his Treatise on Probability of 1921 [20] by Keynes, 
who thought of logical probability as a degree of partial implication. A later classic 
work is E.T. Jaynes’ Probability Theory: The Logic of Science [19]. (Recent 
explanations and defenses in [10], [11])  
That view of probability contrasts with, for example: 
 Psychological views that deal only in people’s actual degrees of belief in 
propositions – defenders of logical probability are keen to emphasise the 
difference between what people in fact believe and what they ought to believe 
 Sociological views that people’s degrees of belief are socially 
constructed (solely) on the basis of power relations, patronage and so on 
 “Subjective Bayesianism”, which allows one to have any degrees of 
belief one likes in propositions, provided the system is “consistent”, e.g. that 
one’s degree of belief in not-p is 1 minus one’s degree of belief in p. (Subjective 
Bayesianism led the revival of Bayesian statistics around the 1970s and 1980s, 
but Bayesianism has tended in a more objectivist direction since then. [5] The 
school of “objective Bayesianism” comes close to the logical view of probability 
[27]) 
 Frequentism and propensity interpretations of probability, which believe 
that all probabilities are about relative frequencies or  physical propensities 
(biases), and that there is no such thing as what one ought to believe on non-
conclusive evidence 
The logical probabilist does not of course deny that there are such things as relative 
frequencies, stochastic processes and degrees of belief, which may satisfy appropriate 
axioms and arguably deserve the name “probabilities”. What is claimed is that over and 
above all such things, there is an objective logical relation of evidence to conclusion, 
short of full logical implication. 
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It is not essential to the logical perspective that the relation of evidence to 
conclusion should be given a precise number, nor that it be possible to compute the 
logical relation between evidence and conclusion in typical cases. It is sufficient that it 
is sometimes intuitively evident that some hypotheses, on some bodies of evidence, are 
highly likely, almost certain, or virtually impossible. 
The most central theses of logical probability do not concern numbers but are 
certain qualitative principles of evidence. The first is the simplest principle of logical 
probability, called by Pólya “the fundamental inductive pattern” ([24] vol. II, 4)  It is: 
 
q  is a (non-trivial) consequence of hypothesis p 
q is found to be true 
 
So, p is more likely to be true than before 
 
In short, “Theories are confirmed by their consequences or predictions.” 
Surely that is an absolutely basic principle of reasoning. How could one make 
progress in science or ordinary life without thinking that way? Science relies on theories 
being confirmed by their predictions being found true; the detective reasons that if the 
butler did it, the knife will be behind the sofa, and finding it there gives greater credence 
to his theory. The Riemann Hypothesis implies the Prime Number Theorem, so the 
proof of the latter supports the Hypothesis. 
Imagine a tribe that did not believe in that principle of reasoning. Surmising that 
there are bison in the river field, they go there to hunt them. Finding none, they gain 
confidence in their theory and return the next day and the one after, increasing their 
confidence as their theory the more it is disconfirmed. It is necessary to imagine that 
tribe since they are not around to be interviewed. They are extinct. Confirmation of 
theories by their consequences is such a basic principle that, outside deductive sciences 
such as mathematics and logic, little reasoning is free of it. 
“Theories are confirmed by their consequences” is also (as not often noted) a 
simple consequence of Bayes’ theorem – indeed, the main content of that theorem (and 
thus the logical view of probability can be called a form of Bayesianism). If, by way of 
idealization, one did suppose that the relation of evidence to conclusion could be given 
a number, then it would be natural to axiomatize it by the usual axioms of conditional 
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probability:  P(h|e), the “logical probability of hypothesis h on evidence e”, is a number 
between 0 and 1 inclusive satisfying 
P(not-h|e) = 1 - P(h|e) 
P(h1 & h2|e) = P(h1|e) × P(h2|h1 & e) 
 
Then Bayes’ Theorem, virtually a restatement of the second axiom, is: 
 P(h|e) = P(e|h) × P(h) / P(e) 
(where P(p) is an abbreviation, for ease of reading, of P(p|b), b being the assumed 
background information.) Now if the evidence e is a consequence of the hypothesis h, 
then  P(e|h) = 1. So 
 P(h|e) = P(h) / P(e) 
If e is non-trivial, that is, not known with certainty already, then  P(e) < 1. So P(h|e) 
equals P(h)  divided by a number less than 1. So  P(h|e) > P(h),  that is, the hypothesis is 
more probable on the evidence than it was before. In other words, theories are 
confirmed by their consequences. 
(Exercise: Formulate, and derive from Bayes’ Theorem, Pólya’s “Verification of an 
improbable consequence” principle ([24] vol. II, 8): 
 
p implies q 
q very improbable in itself 
q true 
 
So, p very much more credible          )  
 
Many logical probabilists and Bayesians do believe that there is at least in principle 
a number (between 0 and 1) expressing the (logical) probability P(h|e) of any given 
hypothesis h on any given body of evidence e. Indeed, that might be called the most 
orthodox Bayesian position. But Keynes argued that it was impossible to give every 
probability a number. Certainly, it seems both impossible and pointless to debate 
precise numbers for, say: 
P(Marilyn Monroe was murdered by the CIA | The moon is made of green cheese). 
In such a case, there is no logical relation between “evidence” and conclusion, so there 
is no point looking for a number to express it. (Further in [11]) 
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The proportional syllogism and prior probabilities 
 
That is not to say that logical probabilists are shy of numbers when appropriate. 
Other than the “verification of a consequence” schema, the other main form of non-
deductive inference is the “proportional syllogism” or “statistical syllogism”, which is 
inherently numerical. The strength of the argument: 
 
Tex is a Texan 
90% of Texans are rich 
 
So, Tex is rich 
  
is very reasonably assigned a number, namely 0.9. (Note carefully that this assertion is 
not undermined by objections like “What if Tex were a philosopher? He’d hardly be 
likely to be rich then.” Logical probability states the evidential relation between a 
hypothesis and given evidence, not that between the hypothesis and some other body of 
evidence. The fact that 
P(Tex is rich | Tex is a Texan and 90% of Texans are rich)  =  0.9 
is not called into question by P(Tex is rich | e)  being other than 0.9 for other bodies of 
evidence e.) Nor is there any requirement that the individual be chosen “randomly”. 
Reasoning from frequencies – often imprecise ones – is ubiquitous in ordinary life, 
in forms like “The vast majority of plane flights land safely, so I can relax on takeoff;” 
“most patients with disease X who take drug Y are cured, so this patient with disease X 
(and no contraindications) can expect to be cured with drug Y.” If that pattern of 
reasoning were not justified, there would be no point in collecting statistics – or at least, 
it would be impossible to learn from them. 
The success of the proportional syllogism gives some insight also into the problem 
of “choosing priors”, which has sometimes been thought to be a fatal objection to 
Bayesianism. When we consider Bayes theorem in the form  
P(h|e) = P(e|h) × P(h) / P(e) 
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it appears that we can only get started if we already know the “prior” P(h), the 
probability of hypothesis h “initially”, that is, on our background knowledge. If we 
cannot explain where that comes from, we face an infinite regress of probabilities. 
The proportional syllogism shows how we can reach bedrock and achieve absolute 
logical probabilities. All that is required to reach the figure of 0.9 for the probability of 
Tex’s being rich is that all Texans should count equally (as always, unless there is 
definite reason to think otherwise). But that is just the symmetry of individual constants, 
which is a principle of logic. 
Mathematical applications of the proportional syllogism to conjectures seem to be 
rare, but not totally unknown. If we despaired of understanding anything about the 
inherent likelihood of proving or disproving the  P = NP  conjecture, and just estimated 
when it might be resolved by looking at the times for hard conjectures in general to be 
resolved – and that has been done ([1], more soundly in [18]) – that is applying a 
proportional syllogism. (The analyses give a 40-50% chance of the P = NP being 
resolved in about 15 years; betting with large stakes is not advised.) 
 
How can there be probabilistic relations between necessary truths? 
There is a puzzle concerning how there could be probabilistic relations between the 
necessary truths of mathematics, the resolution of which reveals something important 
about how logic works in mathematics. 
Suppose one argued: If e entails h, then P(h|e) is 1. But in mathematics, the typical 
case is that e does entail h, though that is perhaps as yet unknown. If, however, P(h|e) is 
really 1, how is it possible in the meantime to discuss the (non-deductive) support that e 
may give to h, that is, to treat P(h|e) as not equal to 1? In other words, if h and e are 
necessarily true or false, how can P(h|e) be other than 0 or 1? 
There must be something wrong with that reasoning, as it parallels the obviously 
erroneous “The coin is determined to come up either heads or tails, so the true 
probability of heads must be either 0 or 1.” Probability is a relation between 
propositions, some of which are known and some not. On the evidence available before 
the coin throw, the probability of heads can be ½, even if on some other evidence (very 
precise physical measurements and calculations) it is 0 or 1. 
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Similarly with the evidence for mathematical propositions. There can be a deductive 
and non-deductive path from evidence to conclusion, with only the latter known. Before 
the Greeks’ development of deductive geometry, it would have been possible to argue 
 
All equilateral (plane) triangles so far measured have been found to be 
equiangular 
This triangle is equilateral 
 
Therefore, this triangle is equiangular 
 
There is a non-deductive logical relation between the premises and the conclusion: the 
premises inductively support the conclusion. But when deductive geometry appeared, it 
was found that there was also a deductive relation, since the second premise alone 
entails the conclusion. That discovery in no way vitiates the correctness of the previous 
non-deductive reasoning or casts doubt on the existence of the non-deductive relation. 
That relation cannot be affected by discoveries about any other relation. 
So the answer to the question, “How can there be probabilistic relations between 
necessary truths?” is simply that those relations are additional to any deductive relations 
(and may be known independently of them). 
 
Inductive reasoning in mathematics 
Here we do not mean the (deductive) method of mathematical induction, but 
ordinary inductive reasoning, as in “All observed ravens have been black, therefore it is 
likely that the next raven to be observed will be black.” Reasoning from sample to 
population cannot be deductive – whatever is observed in the sample, the opposite could 
happen outside the sample. In an example adapted from Bertrand Russell, the turkey’s 
predicting it will be fed each morning, as in the past, is no guarantee against Christmas. 
Philosophers have spent much effort looking for principles that might support 
inductive reasoning, such as the “uniformity of nature”, or laws of nature, or something 
about the nature of causes. Does causality act as a “cement of the universe” (in the 
philosopher David Hume’s phrase) binding the future to the past? 
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That line of thinking cannot be right, since simple inductive reasoning works just as 
well in pure mathematics. But in pure mathematics, there is no causality, no laws of 
nature, and mathematics is true in all universes, uniform or otherwise. 
A particularly straightforward case of inductive reasoning in pure mathematics is: 
 
The first million digits of  are random 
 
Therefore, the second million digits of  are random. 
 
(“Random” here means the purely mathematical notion “without pattern”, not 
“probabilistically generated”, “stochastic”; the notion of patternlessness can be analyzed 
in several ways involving complexity and compression [7], but for the purposes of this 
example it can be taken to mean simply “passes standard statistical tests for 
randomness”.) 
The decimal expansion of , 
3.14159265358979323846264338327950288419716939937 … 
has no apparent pattern. The first million digits have long been calculated (calculations 
have reached beyond one trillion). Inspection of these digits reveals no pattern, and 
computer calculations applying standard tests for randomness confirm this impression. 
It can then be argued inductively that the second million digits will likewise exhibit no 
pattern. This induction is a good one. Indeed, it is generally believed that the digits of  
continue to be random indefinitely, though there is no proof [21]; of the simplest 
consequence of randomness, normality (the equidistribution of digits), recent 
computational scientists write “we tested positively the normality of a prefix of roughly 
four trillion hexadecimal digits of π … it is extraordinarily unlikely that π is not 
asymptotically normal base 16, given the normality of its initial segment.” [2] However, 
an even more recent article claims that, although the calculated digits of π pass the usual 
suite of statistical tests, there is a more sophisticated test which the calculated digits fail 
“at a high level of statistical significance”. [13] No doubt this unsettling result will be 
subject to close examination. 
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Many other cases of inductive reasoning in mathematics involve the calculation of 
large amounts of numerical evidence for long-standing conjectures. There is a 
distributed computing project that has checked the Goldbach Conjecture for even 
numbers up to and beyond 1018. [16] Calculation with the Riemann Hypothesis had 
checked the first 1013  zeros of the Riemann Zeta Function by 2004. [17] They are 
among the biggest inductions in the world. 
Actually those inductions that bear on general propositions about numbers are not 
very strong, taken just by themselves, for the same reason as “The roses in my garden 
are red, therefore all roses whatsoever are red”: the extrapolation is very bold. As 
pointed out by Alan Baker, all numbers calculated with are small (compared to numbers 
in general), so it is quite a leap from what is true in a finite set of small numbers to the 
infinite set of (mostly) large numbers. ([3]; dramatized in [25]) The Pólya Conjecture 
(that the majority of numbers less than a given number have an odd number of prime 
factors) is often given as an example of a conjecture once believed on the basis of 
having no small counterexamples, but which does have large counterexamples. [26] 
That does not however prevent more modest inductions from being strong, such as that 
from the first million digits of  to the second million, or those in which purely 
numerical evidence is combined with other considerations, which can suggest that being 
small is an irrelevant attribute and thus the small numbers are a “fair” sample. 
These examples illustrate Pólya’s remark that non-deductive logic is better 
appreciated in mathematics than in the natural sciences. ([24] vol II, 24) If 
mathematicians could just get straight their use of non-deductive reasoning and reflect 
on it a little, they would have something important to contribute to the understanding of 
scientific reasoning. 
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